OpinionUkraine maps show the price of allies’ hesitation
Last September, Ukraine requested Western tanks from allies to push back against Russia’s invasion. At that time, Russia had not consolidated much of its hold on the territory it had taken. While allies debated whether they should send tanks, Russia began to dig in:
Sept. 4, 2022
When Ukraine first requested Western tanks, satellite images show that Russia had only started to build fortifications.
Jan. 25, 2023
By the time Ukraine finally received the tanks, half a year later, hundreds of miles of fortifications were visible from space.
Take the occupied city of Tokmak in Zaporizhzhia Oblast as an example: This is how the city looked in satellite imagery on Oct. 18, 2022.
Over the next two months, Russians set up barriers outside the major roads into the city. By Jan. 26, the entire city was surrounded by fortifications.
The pattern then repeated itself. Ukraine publicly asked for cluster munitions from the United States last winter, shortly after it had liberated the southern city of Kherson. The Biden administration delayed responding to the request. Meanwhile, this is what happened in occupied territory:
Dec. 8, 2022
When Ukraine requested U.S. cluster munitions, most of Russia’s new fortifications were concentrated near the front line.
July 6, 2023
Six months later, when Ukraine finally received the cluster munitions from the United States, Russia had fortified huge swaths of occupied eastern and southern Ukraine, along the border and throughout northern Crimea.
Without fear of Ukrainian-operated Western tanks or long-range missiles, Moscow’s soldiers were able to expand defenses close to the front line and deep within occupied territory.
These positions generally consist of trenches, anti-vehicle barriers and land mines. Michael Newton, who leads land-mine-clearing operations in Ukraine for the HALO Trust, describes Russia’s mine-laying in occupied Ukrainian territory as taking place on an “industrial level.”
The network of fortifications consists of a primary defensive line and multiple layers of fallback positions. This means that not all of Russia’s trenches are manned, but they provide ready-made fighting positions aimed at stalling a Ukrainian advance.
Here are some illustrative examples:
Russia took the eastern Ukrainian city of Lysychansk in July 2022. New fortifications between the city and a nearby oil refinery underscore its importance to Russian forces.
Located by the Black Sea, Berdyansk Airport is a base for Russian helicopters operating over occupied regions in southern Ukraine. Russian forces put up extensive barriers and trenches around it earlier this year.
Closer to the front line, Russian forces constructed layers of fortifications along the 50 kilometers of highway that connect the occupied cities of Polohy and Tokmak.
Even in Crimea, occupied by Russia since 2014, satellite images show new defenses along roads leading into the peninsula.
The pattern of delay is still in place. Ukraine has been asking for long-range missiles it would like to use to strike Russian command posts, staging areas and supply depots behind the front lines. The United States is once again dragging its feet.
Whether it is worries about escalation or worries about supply shortages, the smart bet in Washington is that the long-range missiles, like the tanks and the cluster munitions before them, will ultimately be delivered.
If the past year of the conflict has shown anything, it’s that this kind of vacillation is costly. It not only squanders additional Ukrainian lives, but it also makes a protracted, grinding conflict more likely.
Ukraine’s allies have long recognized the frantic pace at which Russia has been building defenses in occupied territory. But this realization had little bearing on the speed of their own decision-making. That needs to change. Instead of uncomfortably looking on as Ukraine’s counteroffensive devolves into a slow war of attrition, Western leaders should become more proactive.
Ukraine needs our help, not our excuses.